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--- title: PTO_Theatre_Statistics --- ::: mw-parser-output [Japan economic statistics](http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/primary_documents/presentations/AIChE%202003%20Spring%20National%20Meeting/Paper%2080d%20Stranges%20Japan.pdf){.external .text rel="nofollow"} ## [ Supply ]{#Supply .mw-headline} - According to Japanese projections at the outbreak of war, about 1.8 million tons of shipping would be lost to Allied attack in the first 24 months of the war (2.71) - Yet in 21 months, 3.8 million tons ahd actually been lost - Allied aerial attacks accounted for only 24% of the loss, while submarine attacks accounted for 55% of the loss ```{=html} <!-- --> ``` - At the outbreak of war, Japan had a transport capability of about 5.5 million tons. By the end of 1943, even after herculean efforts to build new ships, the capability was reduced to about 77% percent of prewar level (2.71-72) - In 1943 alone, the reduction was 16%, with the worst obviously yet to come - At the Imperial Conference in November 1941, it was estimated that the petroleum imports from Southeast Asia would rise steadily and that by 1944 they should supply 84% of her needs. - In 1943, Japan was already forced to turn to synthetic fuel in the volume of 760 000 litres to make up for the shortfall - By Feb 1944, the total oil tanker loss reached 111 000 tons - The fuel shortage in turn severely affected the production of such critical items as steel, airplanes, general ornance, warships, merchant ships, and motor vehicles which all began to decline sharply after mid-1944. ## [ Troop Deployment ]{#Troop_Deployment .mw-headline} - Japan maintained 600 000 troops in China proper and 500 000 troops in Southeast Asia at around 1943 (2.72) # [ References ]{#References .mw-headline} 2\. Ch\'i, Hsi-Sheng. Nationalist China at War: Military Defeats and Political Collapse, 1937-45, University of Michigan Press: Michigan, 1982, ISBN 0472100181 :::