CBI Theatre Statistics

Manpower

The Disposition of Japanese Army Forces in Various War Theatres between 1937 and 1941 (in number of divisions)

Year

War Theatres

Total Strength of the Japanese Army

China

Japan and Korea

Manchuria

Total

1937

16

3

5

24

950 000

1938

24

2

8

34

1 130 000

1939

25

7

9

41

1 240 000

1940

27

11

12

50

1 350 000

1941

27

11

13

51

2 110 500

Source: Liu, F.F. A Military History of Modern China: 1924-1949 , Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 1956, ISBN 0313230129

The Disposition of the Japanese Army Forces in December 1941

Type

China

Pacific and Southeast Asia

Manchuria

Japan

Korea and Formosa

Army division

21 (1)

10 (2)

13

4

2

Mixed brigade or equivalent

20 (1)

3

24

11

Army air squadron

16

70

56

9

Source: Liu, F.F. A Military History of Modern China: 1924-1949 , Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 1956, ISBN 0313230129, p.209

(1) Plus one cavalry group army and one army division at Shanghai under the direct command of the Imperial General Headquarters
(2) Plus one special column. Of these ten divisions two were shipped from the China theatre.

Japanese Mobilization for Operation Ichigo, 1944

Items

Henan Campaign

Hunan-Guangxi Campaign

Total

Manpower

148 000

362 000

510 000

Horses

33 000

67 000

100 000

Artillery

269

1 282

1 551

Tanks

691

103

794

Motor Vehicles

6 100

9 450

15 550

Source: Ch'i, Hsi-Sheng. Nationalist China at War: Military Defeats and Political Collapse, 1937-45 , University of Michigan Press: Michigan, 1982, ISBN 0472100181, p. 78

Defection of Chinese to the Japanese puppet in China (1941-1943)

Type

1941

1942

1943

Generals

12

15

42

Troops

500 000

Source: Eastman, L. E. et. al. (1991). The Nationalist Era in China: 1927-1949. Cambridge University: Cambridge, ISBN 0521385911, p. 137

  • Puppet armies numbered close to 1 000 000 att he end of the war(3.139)

Casualties

Chinese Army Casualties (1940-1943)

Type

1940

1941

1942

1943

1944

Death

340 000

145 000

88 000

43 000

311 276 (1)

Source: Eastman, L. E. et. al. (1991). The Nationalist Era in China: 1927-1949. Cambridge University: Cambridge, ISBN 0521385911, p. 137

(1) Source: (2.81)

  • Total wartime casualties is 3 211 419 including 1 319 958 dead (3.137)

Infrastructure

  • The Chinese government constructed some 2 300 miles of railway track - an increase of 47% over the 1927 trackage (3.41)

Industrial Production

  • The Chinese economy was overwhelmingly agrarian and traditional. In 1933, for example the modern sectore of manufacturing, mining and utilities accounted for only about 3.4% of the net domestic product. 4 out of every 5 Chinese, on the other hand, were employed in agriculture, and produce about 65% of the net domestic product. The farmers lived in appalling poverty, a year of sickness or poor weather. In 1930, China's death rate was about the highest in the world, 2.5 times higher than that of the US and markedly higher than that of India (3.36)
    • however, 1936-37 were bumper harvests, the best in nearly 20 years.
  • Industry grew at an impressive rate during the period 1927-1936. (3.40)
    • industry of China (ex Manchuria) grew at an annual rate of 6.7% from 1931-1936
    • Electric power doubled during the decade
    • this compares quite favorably compared to other countries
    • however, the base upon which production increases were calculated was exceedingly small
    • China's electric-opwer output in 1928 was 880 000 MWH, compared to 5 000 000 in the USSR and 88 000 000 in the USA.
  • Due to limited military production capacity, the damage of war, and the general shortage of nonferrous metals and explosives, the total Chinese production in the war years amounted to 800 0000 rifles, 87 000 machine guns and 12 000 light mortars. (2.63)
  • The area that was to become unoccupied China (three-fourths of the nation's territory), had: (3.160)
    • 6% of the nation's factories
    • 7% of the industrial workers
    • 4% of the total capital invested in industry
    • 4% of the electrical capacity
  • By 1944, the entire government controlled area produced anually only 40 134 metric tons of iron, 13 361 metric tons of steel, 40 655 barrels of cement, 4 677 lathes and 14 487 horsepower of motors (2.167)
    • the output of some minerals including tungsten and tin actually declined drastically
    • the capacity of China's arsenals was reduced to 50% of its prewar level
    • also in 1944 was Operation Ichigo
      • hardest hit were factories located in Henan, Hunan and Guangxi, where over 90% of the capacity in some industries was destroyed
  • Direct taxes constituted only 12% of the gov'ts cash budgetary receipts in 1943, and barely 5% in 1944
    • From 1937-1944, public borrowing (i.e. the public buying bonds from the gov't) amounted to only CHI$15 522 million.

Factories (1) in unoccupied China

1936 and before

1937

1938

1939

1940

1941

1942

1943

1944

Uncertain date of origin

Total

Number of plants established

300

63

209

419

571

866

1 138

1 049

549

102

5 266

Capitalization of new plants in 1937 currency (thousands of yuan)

117 950

22 166

86 583

120 914

59 031

9 896

14 486

3 419

7 317

487 481

factories actually in operation

-

-

-

-

1 354

-

2 123

-

928

-

-

Source: Eastman, L. E. et. al. (1991). The Nationalist Era in China: 1927-1949 . Cambridge University: Cambridge, ISBN 0521385911, p. 137

(1) By official definition, a factory used power machinery and employed at least 30 workers.

Retreat into the Interior

  • equipment of 146 factories, weighting 15 000 tons and accompanied by over 2500 workers was removed from Shanghai as bullets were flying. The destination of most of these factories during the early stage of the war was Wuhan (3.130)
    • the flight to the interior was resumed after Wuhan was threatened by the Japanese advance
    • Some factories were shipped by boat across Dongting Lake to Guangxi or western Hunan, others went by rail to Xi'an and Baoji in Shaanxi
    • many put on junks and towed up the Yangtze.
    • Altogether, 639 private factories were removed to the unoccupied areas (abnout three fourthers ultimately resumed production)
    • equipment from the two large but antiquated iron-and-steel plants at Wuhan, including the Hanyang Steel Works represented a major part of this transshipment (37 000 tons)
    • In addition, there was the machinery of 115 textile factories weighing 32 000 tons and of 230 machine-making plants weighing nearly 19 000 tons
    • Joining these factories in flight were 42 000 skilled workmen, 12 000 of whom came with the financial assistance of the government.
    • the amount of machinery removed, totalling some 120 000 tons was insignificant relative to both the existing industrial plant and nationalist China's wartime needs
  • Frantic efforts by the central government succeeded in salvaging some 600 factories, 120 000 tons of industrial equipment and about 10 000 industrial workers (2.166)
    • between 1937-1945, the nominal number of industrial plants in the interior increased to 4 400 in 1945, the overwhelming majority of them were very small, had insufficient capital, obsolete machines and their output was both crude and insignificant

Supply and Foreign Aid

  • In late 1939, the Chinese army of close to 4.5 million had only 1.6 million rifles, 68 782 LMGs, 17 700 HMGs, 5 885 morars, 2 650 pieces of artillery of all description. At end of 1939, China had only 1 532 military vehicles (2.60)
  • By late 1943, the Chinese army of 3 million men was equipped with only 1 million rifles, 83 000 machine guns, 7 800 trench mortars, and 1 300 pieces of artillery of diverse description (2.64)
  • During the first 16 months of the war, an estimated 60 000 tons of [munitions] were brought in each month through Hong Kong
  • 700 000 tons reached [Hankou] before that city fell into Japanese hands
  • 2 000 tons a month came in though French Indochina
  • Burma Road supplied about 7 500 tons of American lend-lease goods per month
    • before this, Germany provided about 60% of Chinese imports and Denmark, Sweden, the USSR and the USA the rest
  • between May 1941 and April 1942, some 110 864 tons were earmarked for China, and most of it reached its destination
  • during the next three years, the United States delivered 736 374 tons of material over the "Hump" into China, much of it for the support of Chinese-based American Forces.
  • with an army of 1.5 million fighting on a modest infantry scale, China needed a continuous flow of at least 100 000 tons per month to sustain optimum efficiency.
  • At full strength, a division's monthly ration of provisions was about 270 tons (2.64)

Estimates on Monthly Tonnage Reaching Unoccupied Wartime China

Period

Estimated Monthly Tonnage

Notes

July 1937 to Nov 1938

62 000

Nov 1938 to Nov 1939

6 800

1937 to 1939

60 000

From Soviet Russia by way of Odessa

Nov 1939 to July 1940

7 800

July 1940 to Oct 1940

3 800

Oct 1940 to Dec 1940

5 000

Early 1941 to Jan 1942

7 500-10 000

May 1945 to June 1945

28 000

Over the Stilwell Road, including the weight of trucks

July 1945 to Sept 1945

15 900-23 000

Over the Stilwell Road, including the weight of trucks

Source: Liu, F.F. A Military History of Modern China: 1924-1949 , Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 1956, ISBN 0313230129, p. 157

  • Pre-1941 Loans to China from other countries: (3.144)
    • French loaned USD$5 000 000 to China for the construction of a railway from the Indochina border to Nanning in Guangxi
    • US purchased Chinese silver to increase China's purchasing power on the domestic market valued at USD$ 157 000 000
    • In Dec 1938, US and Britain granted loans of US $25 000 000 and 500 000 pounds (USD$ 2 000 000) respectively
    • 1940, US promised credits of $45 000 000 in 1940 and $100 000 000 in 1941
    • in late 1941, the US began sending armaments and other materiel to China under the terms of the Lend-Lease act (see Lend-Lease)
  • Pre Pacific war, total foreign credits authorized to China amounted to $500 million (2.168)
    • half of it coming from the USSR, mostly in military supplies and services
    • Nov 1940, the US (for the first time) extends a credit of $50 million to China for monetary protection and management
    • American lend-lease to China up to 1941 was only $26 million compared to the $1.5 billion sent to her European allies
    • before the Pacific war, American authorized credits amounted to $170 million, and UK's amounted to $78 million
  • of the $500 million, however, onlt about 4330 million were utilized
  • by 1942, Soviet aid had dried up (2.168)
    • However, $500 million of credits were extended by the US, which became the only important souce of foreign aid for the rest of the war

From the Soviets

  • During 1937-1939, the USSR supplied a total of about 1 000 planes, 2 000 'volunteer' pilots, 500 military advisers, and substantial stores of artillery, munitions and petrol (3.144)
    • these were provided on the basis of three medium-term, low-interest (3%) credits, totalling USD$ 250 000 000
    • Soviet aid continued until Hitler's forced marched into Russia in 1941
    • virtually none of the Russian aid was channelled to the Chinese communists.
  • Between 1937 and 1939, Soviet loans amounted to about $300 million, Soviet military advisors soon numbered 500, and Soviet delivery of military hardware totalled about 60 000 tons

Lend-Lease

American Lend-Lease to China, Monetary Equivalent (millions of dollars)

Period

Lend-lease Aid

%age of Global American Lend-Lease

Notes

1941

26

1.7

1942

100

1.5

1943

49

0.4

1944

53

0.4

1945

1 107

8.0

Source: Ch'i, Hsi-Sheng. Nationalist China at War: Military Defeats and Political Collapse, 1937-45 , University of Michigan Press: Michigan, 1982, ISBN 0472100181, p. 64


Some facts on the Burma road and the Hump:

The Hump

Estimates on Monthly Tonnage Travelling Over the Hump

Period

Estimated Monthly Tonnage

Notes

May 1942

80

June 1942

106

Sept 1942

1 986 (2 000 (3.145))

Feb 1943

3 200

(3.145)

Apr 1943

2 500

(3.145)

June 1943

3 000

July 1943

5 000

Jan 1944

13 500 (14 500 (3.145))

June 1944

18 200

(3.145)

Oct 1944

>30 000

(2.64)

Dec 1944

34 800

(3.145)

Jan 1945

46 000 (46 500 (3.145))

June 1945

58 300

July 1945

73 700

Aug 1945

63 100

Sept 1945

49 200

Source: Unless otherwise marked, Liu, F.F. A Military History of Modern China: 1924-1949 , Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 1956, ISBN 0313230129, p. 157

  • For the entire year of 1943, only 61 151 tons were flown into China by the ATC [Air Transport Command], an amount that would have kept a single American infantry division in operation for only 68 days after it had been fully equipped. (2.63-64)
  • The total tonnage airlifted into China was anbout 650 000 tons, or the equivalent of the cargo capacity of 70 Liberty ships (2.64)
    • this was about 3.0% of total American lend-lease aid for 1941-1946 inclusive

http://warren421.home.comcast.net/humproute.jpg "There were 167,285 trips that moved 740,000 tons of material to support Chinese troops and other Allied forces." http://warren421.home.comcast.net/history.html

"Yet, air supply to China increased from three thousand seven hundred tons in 1942 to nearly thirty five thousand tons in October 1944 alone. While that was substantial, still it was insufficient to maintain China's army, let alone its population." http://www.coa-hs.org/tribute/part_seven/part6.htm

The Burma Road

"The Allied supply lines were improving by October 1944 capacity on the North-east Indian Railways had been raised to 4,400 tons a day from the 600 tons a day at the start of the war."

"The Allies were forced to increase the tonnage carried by the Northeast Indian Railways to three times their peace time levels. This was only made possible with the use of specialised American railroad units using American and Canadian locomotives." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burma_Campaign

"a. In February: Movement of supplies over the Burma Road totaled just over 13,700 tons or an average of 490 tons a day." http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box2/t16s02.html

"Chiang also questioned the level of lend-lease supplies and their transportation to China itself. U.S. and Chinese leaders had agreed that the Thirty Division plan, approved in 1941, and aid for building a 500-plane Chinese air force, would require delivery of at least 7,500 tons of supplies per month. Because of production problems in the United States, however, the War Department was able to forward only 3,500 tons per month to China through most of the rest of 1942. Although it approved an additional 1,500 tons per month to U.S. air units in China, for a monthly goal of 5,000 tons, even this supplement was unrealized." http://www.ranger95.com/military_history/asiatic_pacific_theatre/china_defensive.html

  • up to the spring of 1942, the Burma road was moving about 15 000 tons of materials into Kunming every month (2.166)
  • 8 when the road was lost, China's imports of machinery and industrial raw materials came to a complete halt.

The Stilwell Road

http://outside.away.com/outside/features/200310/200310_burma_2.html

Hanoi

  • The Chinese were obtaining fully a third of their critically needed imports (in 1940) from the Hanoi-Nanning Railway line until it became occupied by the Japanese.
  • There was another railway line from Hanoi to Kunmin which also became occupied by the Japanese in the late 1940s.

China Leaders